The most strenuous efforts were made to set the verdict aside. The judge granted a stay, and an attempt to get a new trial was made, but unsuccessfully. The sentence was stayed until May, 1888. The statute provided a penalty of one year's imprisonment or $250 fine, or both. Efforts were at once made to soften the sentence. A petition signed by over forty "leading citizens" of Rochester, New York, the home of the Everests, was sent to Judge Haight, praying him, on account of the "untarnished fidelity and integrity" of the convicted men, to make the penalty as light as the court was authorised by law to fix. Six of the jurors were induced by Standard agents to sign a paper claiming that in their belief the jury in rendering its verdict of guilty did not mean to pronounce the Everests guilty of an attempt to blow up or burn the works of the Buffalo company, but guilty only of enticing Miller away, and they recommended that the sentence, therefore, be a fine and not imprisonment. District- Attorney Quinby offered to prove on a hearing for a new trial that the Standard's representatives used money in getting these affidavits. The result was that the two Everests were each fined $250. This sentence was made light, the judge explained, because of the civil suits brought to recover damages for the very same acts — a person could not be punished twice for the same offence.

The first civil suit referred to above resulted in an award by the jury of $20,000 to Matthews. The second civil suit was for $250,000, but before it was tried Matthews's business had become so involved by all this trouble that in January, 1888, it was put into the hands of a receiver. The defendants finally offered to settle the civil suits for $85,000. The judge ordered the receiver to accept the offer, on the ground that the Everests had already been declared guilty of criminal conspiracy and had been fined, and that a person could not be punished twice for the same offence!

It was not until June, 1889, that the receiver filed his account of the settlement of the affairs of the Buffalo Works. Of the $85,000 paid by the Standard, Matthews seems not to have gotten a cent. The entire sum went to settle the debts of the concern and pay the lawyers. The leading claimants among the lawyers were Thomas Corlett, Edward W. Hatch and Adelbert Moot, all of Buffalo. Their claims aggregated nearly $35,000. The receiver thought these fees exorbitant, and a referee was appointed by the court to take the testimony of the claimant as to their services. The testimony was voluminous, and the upshot was that the referee cut these claims to about $22,000. The final account filed by the receiver shows that the three gentlemen finally were paid about $15,000.

The large claims made by the lawyers and certain circumstances of the settlement have led the Standard, in later years, to advance a counter charge of conspiracy of much more serious nature than that which they depended on in the trial. This new charge makes Matthews's counsel his fellow conspirators, and alleges that at least two of them used important official positions to influence the verdict. In the present year (1904) the Standard's official organ, the Oil City Derrick, published a supplement containing the evidence on which this counter charge is based, and editorially accused the writer of bias in not using this material in the story of the Buffalo case which was published practically as it stands here in McClure's Magazine for March, 1904. It is true, as the Derrick claims, that through the courtesy of the Standard Oil Company this material was placed in the writer's hands before the article was published. It was not used because it was not thought it established the charge.

The points brought out in the evidence published by the Derrick which are held by the Standard to establish the charge of a conspiracy between Matthews and his counsel are the following: In the first place, they declare it a conspiracy because Corlett, who was called to the bench in January, 1884, and Hatch, who was called to the bench in January, 1886, were both in consultation with their successors after they became judges. That this is true there is no doubt whatever. Mr. Moot in his full statement of his services made to the referee refers again and again to consultations with Corlett and Hatch after they had given up the case. Hatch speaks freely in his statement to the referee of counselling with Quinby and Moot [113] If there was an impropriety in what he did, he certainly made no effort to conceal it, nor did the referee, the court, or the receiver, to whom this statement was submitted, raise any question of impropriety. The counsel which both Judge Corlett and Judge Hatch gave Quinby and Moot they owed Matthews. They had been his counsel for years. They were obliged to give up his cases because of their election to the bench. They were debarred by their relation to the case, of course, from hearing it, but there was no reason why their knowledge and experience should not be drawn upon to a reasonable degree by the new attorneys. Certainly this is a universal practice in law courts. It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. If either judge had used his position to influence his fellow judge who heard the case there would be a just criticism, but no such intimation has ever been made, to the writer's knowledge.

The second proof of conspiracy drawn from this testimony to the referee is the statements of both Hatch and Moot that they had no contracts for compensation and that they knew they would receive nothing if they lost. For instance, when Moot was examined by the referee he was asked:

Q. Did you have any contract or agreement as to how you should be compensated?

A. Not the slightest. I never had such a contract in my life, except that I should be liberally paid if I succeeded. If I did not succeed, the party being poor, my work would be without compensation. . . .

Q. Did you ever have any conversation with Matthews or with any officer of the company with reference to that?

A. No, sir. I feel very clear that I never had a conversation with a single member of this company about what we should receive for our services, except to this extent: Mr. Matthews once said, in referring to or commenting on these litigations, that they were like any other independent company, as I very well knew; that if the lawyers could not keep them alive with litigation, the Standard would beat them — we would not get anything.

Judge Hatch in his statement said: "Matthews and I or any one for his company never had any talk with respect to compensation for services at the time of their commencement or during their rendition. I knew, however, that the payment for services was largely contingent upon the success of the litigation, and the company was not able to pay much more than the actual expenses in the event they failed to succeed, and that we would get a very meagre compensation unless we succeeded in the actions. I think no conversation was ever had except Mr. Matthews stating that if we should succeed we should be well paid. I think he mentioned that once or twice."

It is not an unusual thing for lawyers to take cases they believe just, knowing that their compensation depends on their winning. Many clients with just cases would be deprived of counsel if they had to insure a fixed compensation, for not infrequently all that a client has is involved in a suit. The practice is so common among reputable lawyers that it certainly cannot be regarded as a proof of a conspiracy, unless there is a reason to suppose that they have taken a case of whose merits they themselves are suspicious. There is absolutely no evidence that Matthews's counsel were not convinced from the first that they had a strong case. Quinby, the district-attorney who tried the criminal case, certainly conducted it with a fire and a logic which nothing but conviction could have inspired. Moreover, it must be remembered that these attorneys never failed to convince the juries before whom they appeared of the merits of their case. Four juries, two grand juries and two petit juries gave unanimous verdicts of conspiracy against the defendants in the course of the litigation. A case backed by evidence which would convince such diversified bodies of men could hardly be called a speculation. Their claims were large, but lawyers are not proverbial for the modesty of their charges, and in the cases of Hatch and Moot, the two making the largest claims, the labour had been very great and had extended over long periods, as one can see who will examine the testimony published by the Derrick; and besides, exorbitant charges can hardly be construed as a proof of conspiracy.

This, then, in outline, is the history of the case on which are based all charges, so far as the writer knows, that the Standard Oil Company has deliberately destroyed property to get rid of rivals. The case is of importance not only as showing to what abuses the Standard policy of making it hard for a rival to do business will lead men like the Everests, but it shows to what lengths a hostile public will go in interpreting the acts of men whom it has come to believe are lawless and relentless in pursuing their own ends. The public, particularly the oil public, has always been willing to believe the worst of the Standard Oil Company. It read into the Buffalo case deliberate arson, and charged not only the Everests, but the three co-directors, with the overt acts. They refused to recognise that no evidence of the connection of Mr. Rogers, Mr. Archbold and Mr. McGregor with the overt acts was offered, but demanded that they be convicted on presumption, and when the judge refused to do this they cursed him as a traitor. To-day, in spite of the full airing this case has had in the courts and investigations, Judge Haight is still accused of selling himself to a corporation, and Mr. Rogers is accused daily in Montana of having burned a refinery in Buffalo. As a matter of fact, no refinery was burned in Buffalo, nor was it ever proved that Mr. Rogers knew anything of the attempts the Everests made to destroy Matthews's business.

Table of Contents