A writer in the Oil City Derrick, quoted in the Cleveland Herald, March 2, 1872, said: "The ring pretend that they will make their margin out of the consumers. That is, that they will put refined up to a figure that will enable them to pay well for crude. . . . The consumers are the avowed victims, since they must pay a price which will warrant the ring in going on with their operations. And the producers' security for the price is a mere matter of discretion."

Wherever the members of the company discussed the subject they put forward this object as one sufficient to justify the combination. If refined oil was put up everybody in the trade would make more money. To this end the public ought to be willing to pay more.

When Mr. Warden was under examination by the committee the chairman said to him: "Under your arrangement, the public would have been put to an additional expense of $7,500,000 a year." "What public?" said Mr. Warden. "They would have had to pay it in Europe." "But to keep up the price abroad you would have to keep up the price at home," said the chairman. Mr. Warden conceded the point: "You could not get a better price for that exported without having a better price here," he said. [22]

Mr. Watson contended that the price could be put up with benefit to the consumer. And when he was asked how, he replied: "By steadying the trade. You will notice what all those familiar with this trade know, that there are very rapid and excessive fluctuations in the oil market; that when these fluctuations take place the retail dealers are always quick to note a rise in price, but very slow to note a fall. Even if two dollars a barrel had been added to the price of oil under a steady trade, I think the price of the retail purchaser would not have been increased. That increased price would only amount to one cent a quart (four cents a gallon), and I think the price would not have been increased to the retail dealer because the fluctuations would have been avoided. That was one object to be accomplished." [23]

The committee were not convinced, however, that a scheme which began by adding four cents to the price of a gallon of oil could be to the good of the consumer. Nor did anything appear in the contracts which showed how the fluctuations in the price of oil were to be avoided. These fluctuations were due to the rise and fall in the crude market, and that depended on the amount of crude coming from the ground. The South Improvement Company might assert that they meant to bring the producers into their scheme and persuade them to keep down the amount of production in the same way they meant to keep down refined, so that the price could be kept steadily high, but they had nothing to prove that they were sincere in the intention, nothing to prove that they had thought of the producer seriously until the trouble in the Oil Regions began. It looked very much to the committee as if the real intention of the company was to keep up the price of refined to a certain figure by limiting the output, and that there was nothing to show that it would not go up with crude though it might not go down with it! Under these circumstances it seemed as if a fluctuating market which gave a moderate average was better for the consumer than the steady high price which Mr. Watson thought so good for the public. Thirty-two cents a gallon was the ideal price they had in view, though refined had not sold for that since 1869, the average price in 1870 being 26-3/8 and in 1871 24-1/4. The refiner who in 1871 sold his oil at 24-1/4 cents a gallon cleared easily fifty-two cents a barrel — a large profit on his investment, — but the refiners in the early stages of this new industry had made much larger profits. It was to perpetuate these early profits that they had gone into the South Improvement Company.

It did not take the full exposition of the objects of the South Improvement Company, brought out by the Congressional Investigating Committee, with the publication of charters and contracts, to convince the country at large that the Oil Regions were right in their opposition. From the first the sympathy of the press and the people were with the oil men. It was evident to everybody that if the railroads had made the contracts as charged (and it daily became more evident they had done so), nothing but an absolute monopoly of the whole oil business by this combination could result. It was robbery, cried the newspapers all over the land. "Under the thin guise of assisting in the development of oil-refining in Pittsburg and Cleveland," said the New York Tribune, "this corporation has simply laid its hand upon the throat of the oil traffic with a demand to 'stand and deliver.'" And if this could be done in the oil business, what was to prevent its being done in any other industry? Why should not a company be formed to control wheat or beef or iron or steel, as well as oil? If the railroads would do this for one company, why not for another? The South Improvement Company, men agreed, was a menace to the free trade of the country. If the oil men yielded now, all industries must suffer from their weakness. The railroads must be taught a lesson as well as would-be monopolists.

The oil men had no thought of yielding. With every day of the war their backbone grew stiffen The men were calmer, too, for their resistance had found a ground which seemed impregnable to them, and arguments against the South Improvement Company now took the place of denunciations. On all sides men said, This is a transportation question, and now is the time to put an end once and forever to the rebates. The sentiment against discrimination on account of amount of freight or for any other reason had been strong in the country since its beginning, and it now crystallised immediately. The country so buzzed with discussion on the duties of the railroads that reporters sent from the Eastern newspapers commented on it. Nothing was commoner, indeed, on the trains which ran the length of the region and were its real forums, than to hear a man explaining that the railways derived their existence and power from the people, that their charters were contracts with the people, that a fundamental provision of these contracts was that there should be no discriminating in favour of one person or one town, that such a discrimination was a violation of charter, that therefore the South Improvement Company was founded on fraud, and the courts must dissolve it if the railways did not abandon it. The Petroleum Producers' Union which had been formed to grapple with the "Monster" actually demanded interstate regulation, for in a circular sent out to newspapers and boards of trade asking their aid against the conspiracy they included this paragraph: "We urge you to exert all your influence with your representatives in Congress to support such measures offered there as will prohibit for all future time any monopoly of railroads or other transportation companies from laying embargoes upon the trade between states by a system of excessive freights or unjust discrimination against buyers or shippers in any trade by the allowance of rebates or drawbacks to any persons whatever. This is a matter of national importance, and only the most decided action can protect you and us from the scheming strength of these monopolies."

How the whole question appeared to an intelligent oil man, one, too, who had had the courage to resist in the attack on the trade in Cleveland, and who still was master of his own refinery, is shown by the following letter to the Cleveland Herald:

EDS. HERALD: As I understand, the financial success of this South Improvement Company is based upon contracts made with the officers (either individually or otherwise) of all the railroads leading out of the Oil Region, by which they (the South Improvement Company) receive as a draw-back certain excess of freights, not only on every barrel of oil shipped out of the Oil Regions by or to themselves, but also on every barrel of oil shipped out of the Oil Regions by or to other refiners, or dealers, or consumers.

The first advance in freights to Cleveland has already been made, viz.: on crude oil, from forty cents to sixty-five cents per barrel. This seemingly slight advance has already caused one party that I know of to pay an excess of over $2,000. Other firms have paid larger or smaller sums, according to the quantity of oil they were compelled to have. This excess, we suppose, goes directly to swell the profits of the South Improvement Company.

This is only the beginning. The whole extent of the evil that may be done to producers, refiners, dealers and consumers, and to the public generally, if this corporation — or rather combination of corporations — is successful, is so deep and varied and far reaching, that it cannot be fully comprehended and I will not attempt it in detail, but only suggest a few inquiries.

Where will be their limits?

How high will they advance freights?

How low will they force the price of crude?

How high refined?

Will they adopt a liberal policy for producers, or will they destroy their interests and crush out the oil production entirely? Will they be liberal with dealers and consumers and adopt uniform rules with steady prices, or will they take advantage of times and circumstances and force ruinous corners upon the trade?

These and many other questions are pertinent, for clearly if they can control the shipment they can control the price of oil, and if they can control the price to the extent of twenty-five cents per barrel, they can control it entirely. If they can control it entirely, where will be their limit? Who will dictate a line of policy to them? And may not one of the greatest and most important industries of this country be destroyed and hundreds of thousands of business men be made bankrupt if this combination is successful and has the disposition to work ruin? I do not say that I think they will work ruin. They undoubtedly will attempt to make all the money they can and will pursue such a policy as in their judgment will bring them the utmost amount of profits, regardless of consequences, but what that policy will be, of course, we can not judge.

It is understood that the parties to this combination excuse themselves and their action before the public by reciting the undoubted facts in the case. They are these: that the refining of oil as a business has been of late and is now overdone; that the capacity for refining petroleum in this country exceeds the production in the ratio of three barrels to one; that the railroads have reduced freights to the lowest extreme, and were even losing money; that refiners, in spite of all their efforts, could not earn their running expenses; that the special interests of Cleveland as a refining point were in danger of being lost; and that this great business might go to other points, and the millions of dollars in refining property here be sacrificed, and thousands of men thrown out of employment; that real estate would depreciate, and that many other collateral troubles connected with the loss of this business would follow; and that now, by the consummation of the plans of this monopoly, all these evils will be avoided.

In answer to this — assuming that the refining interest of Cleveland is a unit in this corporation, that of Pittsburg another, that of New York another, and that of Philadelphia another — it follows that it is immaterial to the stockholders of the "South Improvement Company" whether the oil produced at the Oil Regions is refined by them at their works in Cleveland, or at Pittsburg, or in New York, or in Philadelphia. It would not affect their dividends at all, provided they refined the oil at the cheapest point for them to do so. That place might be Cleveland; it might be Pittsburg, or it might not be either of them; but it might be New York or Philadelphia. Therefore, so long as it is for the pecuniary advantage of this combination to refine at Cleveland they may do so, but no longer, and should it be for the interest of the combination to discontinue their works at Cleveland, what would become of the oil-refining interest at this point? That question everyone can answer. Therefore I see little weight to the argument used that this monopoly is for the benefit of Cleveland. Hence, I do not consider the special danger to Cleveland by any means as averted.

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